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FEDERAL TAXATION IN SEPARATION AND
DIVORCE
EDWARD S. GRAVES*
While the marital relation is proceeding normally and husband and
wife' are living together, taxation affects few, if any, of the ordinary
transactions2 involving the family. For example, no tax consequences re-
sult from the husband's meeting family expenses such as rent, mortgage,
or other bills. Or he may give the wife money and have her pay the bills.
Expenses of support and education of the children are simply met as a
matter of course from the family budget and they can be listed as depend-
ents on the joint return.
Equally free of tax consequences are transfers to the wife of the hus-
band's group life insurance, outright or in trust.3 Other types of trusts are
available as estate planning measures; of course the husband must pay a
gift tax if sufficient property is transferred, but he realizes no taxable gain
on these or any other transfers to her.
No tax consequences result when a spouse acquires inchoate rights of
dower, curtesy, or inheritance in the other's property. And in community
property states, each may obtain a property interest in assets accumulated
*Partner, Edmunds, Williams, Robertson, Sackett, Baldwin & Graves, Lynchburg, Va.;
Visiting Lecturer in Law, Washington & Lee University. A.B. 1930, M.A. 1931, Washington
& Lee University; J.D. 1935, Harvard University. The author wishes to acknowledge the
assistance of Philip G. Gardner, third-year student at Washington & Lee Law School, in
the preparation of this article.
'Strictly speaking, writers in this field should use the word "spouse" or "ex-spouse"
instead of "husband". Since generally the husband is the one obligated to pay support, it is
believed that the substitution of terms may be made without too much difficulty. The same
practice is followed in Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 7701. See also Lagomarcino, The
Divorced Husband and the Dependency Exemption Mirage, 12 TAX. L. REv. 85 (1957).
2Where transfers are made as inter vivos or testamentary gifts, of course gift or estate
taxes must be paid. Such transfers may be made as a step in carrying out an estate plan, or
"accidentally on purpose" if the husband gives to his wife or children amounts in excess of
his duty to support them. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1953).
3Rev. Rul. 68-334, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. See also Walzer, The Disposition of Life Insur-
ance in Divorce Settlements, 46 TAxEs 248 (1968).
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during matrimony. In some states each may acquire the right to a portion
of the property standing in the name of the other.4
To be contrasted with this virtual "tax tranquility" of the marital
status is the situation created by separation and divorce. More than one
taxpayer has found out the hard way that a change in marital circumstan-
ces may entail a marked change in taxation. Federal tax consequences,
some of which may unpleasantly surprise a spouse who has not been well
informed, flow from all of the previously mentioned transfers (and oth-
ers), and their nature and amount may substantially influence negotia-
tions between the parties, affect the provisions of the property settlement
agreement or decree and even render impossible otherwise desirable ar-
rangements.
Although many of the facets of the subject are interrelated, subdivi-
sions by topic will be made in the interest of greater clarity.
I. ALIMONY TREATMENT-PERIODIC PAYMENTS
A. General; Direct and Indirect Payments
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1942, 5 payments for the support of the
wife and children were not deductible by the husband nor taxable to the
wife.6 Two substantially correlative provisions, appearing in the present
Code as sections 71 and 215, provide for the taxation of periodic pay-
ments to the wife, and for the husband's deduction of such of these pay-
ments as are made by him.'
The Code provides that payments must be "periodic," but need not
be made at regular intervals. The term is not otherwise expressly defined
either in the statute or the regulations. To get the alimony treatment set
forth above, the payments must be made pursuant to one of four docu-
ments: a decree of divorce or separate maintenance;8 a written agreement
incident to such decree;9 a written separation agreement entered into after
August 16, 1954; 1" or a decree for support entered after March 1, 1954. 1
Husband and wife must be separated; and joint returns may not be filed.
2
There is one other requirement in order that payments to the wife be
'See generally H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMIESTIc RELATIONS §§ 7.1, 7.2 (1968) (hereinaf-
ter cited as CLARK).
5Act of Oct. 21, 1942, ch. 619, § 120, 56 Stat. 816.
6Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
7Payments made to the wife from other sources (such as trusts) are not included in the
husband's income, and are reported by the wife. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7 1(d).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71(a)(1).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71(a)(1).
I NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71(a)(2).
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71(a)(3).
"2INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7 1(a).
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taxable to her. They must be for certain purposes. Payments under the
first two documents mentioned above must be made in discharge of "a
legal obligation which, because of the marital or family relationship, is
imposed on or incurred by the husband. .. 13 Payments made pursuant
to a written separation agreement entered into after August 16, 1954 must
be made "because of the marital or family relationship."1 And payments
to the wife under a support decree entered after March 1, 1954 must be
"for her support or maintenance". Is The term "marital or family rela-
tionship" is not defined. Little tax difficulty arises insofar as payments
are made by the husband, at more or less regular intervals, to the wife
for her support, even though the payments may vary in accordance with
such objective standards as the husband's earnings,' 6 and even though the
payments are made indirectly, for the wife, instead of directly to her.'
7
Thus, payments by the husband for utilities, real estate taxes, casualty
insurance premiums, and repairs on a residence occupied by the wife are
indirect payments which receive alimony treatment."8 Payments by the
husband on joint indebtedness secured by such residence also receive ali-
mony treatment if the wife owns the house. 9 Payments upon indebtedness
secured by a residence owned by husband and wife as tenants by the
entirety or equal co-owners are 50% deductible by the husband and taxa-
ble to the wife. 0 Where the residence is owned solely by the husband, his
payment for utilities still receives alimony treatment as an indirect pay-
3INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71(a)(l).
HINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71(a)(2).
'5INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71(a)(3). The fact that payments or transfers may be
made because of rights (dower and inheritance) which disappear on divorce, whether ob-
tained by the husband or wife, may trouble lawyers schooled in the concept of consideration.
The tax provisions are not, however, based upon consideration.
'8See, e.g., Holloway v. United States, 428 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1970); Van Orman v.
Commissioner,418 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1970).
"Internal Revenue Service, Income Tax Deductions for Alimony Payments, Publica-
tion 504 at 7 (10-68) (hereinafter cited as Publication 504). If the husband permits the wife
to live in his house, the fair rental value is not considered a payment in kind and does not
get the alimony treatment. R.I.A., 4 TAX COORDINATOR K-6125 (1967); Pappenheimer
v. Allen, 164 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1947); Annot., 4 A.L.R. 2d 252 (1949).
"Publication 504 at 7. See also Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961); see note
25 and accompanying text infra. Unless part of such payments are "fixed" for the children
that live with the wife, they are still entitled to alimony treatment under the Lester case.
"See Rev. Rul. 62-39, 1962-1 CuNi. BULL. 17. There may be a question whether these
payments are periodic, although it may be argued that since the rate of interest on the unpaid
balance might be subject to change, a principal sum could not be calculated. A further
question is whether the husband in such cases is really discharging the wife's indebtedness.
It is true that the indebtedness is secured by real estate owned by her; but this does not
automatically transform his obligation or a joint obligation into her sole obligation, even
though the payments will release her property.
2Rev. Rul. 67-420, 1967-2 CuOi. BULL. 63. See also Publication 504 at 7.
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ment for the support of his wife,2 1 but payments in discharge of indebted-
ness secured do not get such treatment. But the husband may deduct real
estate taxes and interest under other provisions of the Code.?2 If the hus-
band pays premiums on policies insuring his life, an interest in which is
assigned to the wife, deductibility may be subject to some question.? If
the policy is entirely owned by the wife, it is clear that such payments
receive alimony treatment.
24
In order to avoid all questions of indirect payments, the husband may
increase the payments made to the wife for her support by the amount
necessary to pay for all services and obligations. Of course he must be
willing to trust her to make the payments or be indifferent as to whether
she does so or not. Such an arrangement may be considered advantageous
irrespective of tax considerations.
B. Payments for the Support of the Wife and Children
If payments are made to the wife for her support and that of the
children, tax problems arise which are simultaneously solved and accen-
tuated by sections 151 and 152 of the Code, and section 71(b) as inter-
preted by the United States Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Lester.z?
Sections 151 and 1526 govern the allocation of the dependency exemp-
tion to one or the other of the parents.The general rule is that the person
providing more than half the support of a dependent gets the exemption.
Where the children of the parties are in the custody of the wife, two
problems were often encountered by the husband prior to the enactment
of sections 151 and 152. In the first instance, there was no provision in the
law for the parties to settle by agreement the'question of who would take
which child as a dependent. And secondly, it was often difficult for the
husband to find out whether he had contributed more than half of a child's
support because he was unable to ascertain how much the wife had con-
tributed. The amendment of section 152 in 1967 by the addition of subsec-
tion (e) attacked both of these problems in the course of providing new
rules in this area. Now if the husband and wife are divorced or legally
separated under a court decree or a written separation agreement, if they
do not file a joint return, if their child is in the custody of one of them
"1Rev. Rul. 62-89, 1962-1 CuM. BULL. 17; Rev. Rul. 58-52, 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 29. See
also Publication 504 at 7.
22See Rev. Rul. 62-39, 1962-1 CUM. BULL. 17; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 163, 164.
2See, e.g., Walzer, The Disposition of Life Insurance in Divorce Settlements, 46 TAXES
248 (1968); Wenig, Use of Life Insurance and Separation Agreements, N.Y.U. 28TH INST.
ON FED. TAX. 837 (1970). These articles discuss at length the problems incurred in property
settlements relating to the use of life insurance.
-I.T. 4001, 1950-1 CUM. BULL. 27.
-366 U.S. 299 (1961).
26§ 152 was amended in 1967.
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for more than half of the year, and if they furnish more than half of his
support, the exemption is allocated to the parent having greater custody
unless it is otherwise provided. It may be otherwise provided either by
decree or agreement of the parties if the "non-custodial" parents' contrib-
uted $600 for the child. If, however, the non-custodial parent contributed
$1200 or more for child support (regardless of the number of children)
and the custodial parent does not "clearly establish" z that he contributed
more than the non-custodial parent, the custodial parent gets the children
as dependents despite the agreement. If there is a dispute over the amounts
respectively contributed, each parent may obtain from the other an item-
ized statement of his expenditure for the child's support.
The so-called multiple support agreements provided for in section
152(c) prevail over section 152(e). Consequently if no one person contrib-
uted over half of the child's support, if over half of the child's support
was contributed by those in a position to claim the child as a dependent,
if one of these taxpayers contributed over 10% of this support, and the
other contributors mentioned agree that this taxpayer will be entitled to
the child, then he getsthe dependency exemption. These Code provisions
may not strike all parties as entirely equitable, but they have a quality,
rare in federal income tax law, of definiteness.
In Commissioner v. Lester, the Supreme Court, cutting what Mr.
Justice Douglas termed in his concurring opinion "square corners," held
that an amount payable to the wife for herself and three children, with a
reduction of 1/6 thereof when each child died or was emancipated, was
all includible in the wife's income and deductible by the husband. The
Lester case, concerned not with the determination of who is entitled to the
dependency exemption, but whether the alimony treatment is to be ac-
corded payments made by the husband to the wife for the support of the
children, has created some difficulties and opportunities by its literal
interpretation of section 71(b). Section 7 1(b) provides that periodic pay-
ments made to the wife are to be included in her gross income except as
to any part of a payment which the terms of the decree, instrument, or
agreement "fix" as payable for the support of the children.
Two recent cases, West v. United States2 9 and Commissioner v.
zrIreas. Reg. § 1.152-4(b) provides in part:
In the event of so-called "split" custody, or if neither a decree or agree-
ment establishes who had custody, or if the validity or continuing effect
of such decree or agreement is uncertain by reason of proceedings pending
on the last day of the calendar year, "custody" will be deemed to be with
the parent who, as between both parents, has the physical custody of the
child for the greater portion of the calendar year.
'$"Clearly establish" is interpreted as "by a clear preponderance of the evidence." T.D.
7145, cited at 36 FED. REG. 20039 (1971). See Note, The Burden of Proof Required of a
Parent Claiming Child Exemption, 29 NVAsH. & LEE L. REV. 29 (1972).
"41 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1969).
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Gotthelf,3" distinguishing Lester on insubstantial factual differences, ap-
pear to have relaxed the "square corners" approach of Lester in favor of
holding that an agreement or decree "fixes" the amount payable for the
children when it does so by necessary implication. By denying certiorari
in the Gotthelf case,3' the Supreme Court has indicated enough of a retreat
from the Lester case for the parties to determine with considerable assur-
ance whether the alimony treatment will be accorded to payments made
to the wife for the children. Following the Lester formula assures that the
alimony treatment will follow; making modifications in accordance with
Gotthelf and West should assure that it will not. Husbands in higher
income tax brackets may insist on Lester-type provisions; those in lower
brackets may be content with the modifications.
The application of Lester, on the one hand, or Gotthelf and West on
the other, determining which of the parents obtains the dependency ex-
emption for the chilren, is important for reasons other than the allocation
of the dependency exemption, since the parent entitled to the exemption
may also be entitled to deductions for medical expenses for the dependent
child, and the parent with more custody and a dependent in the house may
be entitled to head of household rates.3 2
C. Transfers to or for the Wife in Addition to Regular Payments
Neither the Code nor the Regulations define two of the crucial terms
used in section 71: "Marital or family relationship" and "periodic pay-
ments." This failure has caused no difficulties, as noted above, 33 where
the property transferred to or for the wife is a series of payments either
substantially uniform or varying pursuant to such an objective standard
as a husband's income. Litigation has been caused, however, where there
30407 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1969). In Gotthelf the agreement provided for the husband's
paying $12,000 for the support of his divorced wife and two minor children, with additional
provisions that the total would be reduced by $5,000 if the wife.remarried and by $3,500
per child as he was emancipated. The Court held that $7,000 of the $12,000 was for child
support. In West the Court held that $30 of a $35 per week payment to the wife for her
support and that of their three children was for the support of the children in view of the
provisions that the weekly sum was to be reduced by $10 upon a child's becoming emanci-
pated and $5 if the wife remarried, and also that the wife undertook to spend at least $30
per week for the support of the children.
3-396 U.S. 828 (1969).
N
2 T REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 213 and 1(b) respectively. A question raised under the
Lester doctrine has recently been solved by cases decided in the Fourth and Tenth Circuits.
If payments made to the wife for her support and that of the children are continued in whole
or in part after the wife's right to any alimony has ceased, as upon her remarriage, the
payments are thereafter not entitled to alimony treatment, since they are made solely for
the support of the children. Brown v. Commissioner, 415 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1969); Maytag
v.Commissioner, 370 F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 1966).
=See text accompanying note 16 supra.
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is either a payment of substantially greater size than others in a series, or
the agreement or decree contains one provision governing the series of
uniform payments and another separate provision governing the transfer
of additional property such as corporate stock34 or payments on a house
for the wife.3 Since subsections 7 1(a)(1) and (2) use the broad language
of payments "because of the marital or family relationship," as con-
trasted with the narrow language of "support or maintenance" in subsec-
tion 71(a)(3), it would appear that payments by the husband because of
the wife's dower rights, 36 rights of inheritance,37 right to a portion of the
husband's property,31 or right to community property39 would qualify
under the first two subsections, as well as payments made under these
subsections for her support. The Regulations are, however, inconsistent.4 0
The cases are also in conflict, some indicating that payments for the wife's
marital rights in property qualify, 4' and others taking the position -that
only payments made for the wife's support 2 qualify for alimony treat-
ment. Cases have also denied alimony treatment on the ground that a
payment substantially larger than others in a series is not "periodic," but
is an installment payment upon a lump sum.4 3 The commissioner has
taken inconsistent positions in at least one case, denying deduction of
payments to the husband and taxing the same payments to the wife. 4
While the reasoning of the authorities and the results in the cases are
certainly debatable, the objective of an equitable apportionment of taxes
between the parties in this situation should be kept in mind. Unless the
parties intend the result (and when they have engaged in litigation con-
cerning the deduction it is obvious that they did not), it may be unfair in
many situations to permit the husband an unusually large deduction at
the price of including an unexpectedly large sum in the wife's income. The
unfairness is illustrated by the settled doctrine that, there the husband
mLewis v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 310 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
'Van Orman v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1969).




"Compare Treas. Reg. §§ 1.71-1(a) and 1.71-1(b)(4) (1957) with Treas. Reg. § 1.71-
1 (b)(6), ex.(l) (1957).
"See Brown v. Commissioner, 415 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1969); Phinney v. Mauk, 411 F.2d
1196 (5th Cir. 1969).
"See Van Orman v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1969); McCombs v. Com-
missioner, 397 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1968); Solterman v. United States, 272 F.2d 387 (9th Cir.
1954); Lewis v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 310 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
"See Van Orman v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1969); Tate v. United States,
207 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Knowles v. United States, 182 F. Supp. 150 (S.D. Miss.
1960); Wilma E. Thompson, 50 T.C. 522 (1968).
"Gordon L. Munderloh, 48 T.C. 452 (1967).
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pays the wife arrears of periodic payments in a lump sum, the entire
amount is taxable to her and deductible by him in the year paid.45
The terms "marital or family relationship" and "periodic payments"
used in section 71 should be defined in the Regulations. In drafting the
definitions, it should be borne in mind that variations determined by
objective standards in the amount of individual payments in a series
should not affect their being accorded alimony treatment; that what are
essentially capital transactions, that is, one-time transfers of substantial
property by the husband to the wife in recognition of her contributions
to the accumulation of property during the marriage,46 should not be
accorded alimony treatment; that installment payments of a principal
sum should be governed by existing law; but that one unusually large
initial payment or several unusually large initial payments in a series
should not be denied alimony treatment if the persons intend them to be
periodic payments for the wife's support .
7
D. The Principal Sum Payable in Installments
It may happen that the husband desires to have a ceiling on at least
some of his payments to the wife, and she may agree."' The principal sum
can be stated as such, or may be arrived at by requiring a fixed number
of installments each of a specified amount. In this event, questions arise
as to whether the installment payments are "periodic" within the meaning
of section 71.11
I. The more-than-10-year rule
Section 7 1(c), the source of the more-than-10-year rule, specifies that
the principal sum may be either in money or property. The principal sum
must be fixed by a decree of divorce or separation, a written instrument
incident thereto, or a written separation agreement. A decree for support,
pursuant to section 71 (a)(3), may not be used to create periodic payments
deductible under section 71 (c).
"See Holloway v. United States, 428 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1970).
"See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962); Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d
211 (10th Cir. 1969); Phinney v. Mauk, 411 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1969).
"See Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969); Phinney v. Mauk, 411
F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1969); Lewis v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 310 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
"sAn example of such an arrangement would be where the regular payments made to
the wife for her support and that of the children are insufficient to cover their education.
The husband may be willing to add a fixed sum, payable in installments during these years,
sufficient to cover the educational expenses. If set up properly the payments would receive
the alimony treatment. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 71(c); note 49 infra.
"See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 71(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d) (1957); and Publica-
tion 504 5-6. These sources succinctly clarify the circumstances under which installments
paid by the husband get the alimony treatment.
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If the principal sum is to be paid at all events, then alimony treatment
is not accorded to any installment unless the payments run over a period
in excess of 10 years from the date of one of the instruments0 requiring
the payments. Despite the clarity of the language, more than one taxpayer
has been caught by his failure to fix the payments so that the last would
be more than 10 years after the critical date. 51
The fact that one installment is unusually large does not have the same
effect of creating uncertainty as does an unusually large payment in a
series of periodic payments under section 71 (a). It is expressly provided
in section 71 (c) that the husband may deduct the lesser of payments made
in the tax year or 10% of the principal sum. Consequently, if he pays an
excess amount in any year, he does not receive full tax benefit from it.52
This may constitute a small tax trap for husbands who wish to make
larger installment payments during the first few years followed by smaller
payments in later years.
2. The contingency rule
The Regulationss create the so called contingency rule in which in-
stallment payments of a principal sum fixed by decree, instrument, or
agreement receive the alimony treatment. Such payments must, however,
be in the nature of alimony or an allowance for support.
The contingency rule is that installments of a principal sum are enti-
tled to alimony treatment, irrespective of the more-than-10-year rule, if
the discharge of the sum is subject to any one of the following contingen-
cies, created either by the decree or instrument, by agreement establishing
the obligation, or by local law: first, the power of the court to change the
obligation; u second, the remarriage of the wife; third, the death of either
party; or fourth, a change in the economic status of either party. The
contingency rule takes precedence over the more-than-10-year rule; and
the amounts of the installments are deductible without limitation to 10%
of the principal sum.
The contingency rule is a notable example of logic in the tax laws. If
ONotes 8-10 supra.
"See Joslin v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1970); Furrow v. Commissioner,
292 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1961). The Joslin case illustrates the importance of local law, since
it was held that an agreement providing for the payments over more than a 10-year period
was not effective under Nevada law until it had been approved by the Court, and since the
decree was within the 10-year period, alimony treatment was not accorded to the payments.
52SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(5),ex. (4) (1957).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3) (1957).
u'Under some statutes, the Court may be precluded from changing the provisions of a
property settlement agreement or decree. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109 (Repl. Vol. 1960)
and Dienhart v. Dienhart, 210 Va. 101, 168 S.E.2d 279 (1969); NEv. REv. STAT. § 125.170
(1967).
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the number of installments is not fixed, then no principal sum is specified;
and so section 71(c)(1) does not render the installment payments non-
periodic. The effect, nevertheless, is to make it possible for the parties to
agree upon alimony payments with a ceiling. Both of the principal sum
rules are notable for another reason. The statute, the Regulations, and the




There is, however, one question which is not covered by the principal
sum rules, and that is whether payments of a principal sum in installments
are subject to the rule of the Lester case. The Court in Lester was specifi-
cally concerned with the meaning of the word "fixed" in section 71(b),
but the decision essentially required an interpretation of what constituted
a periodic payment within the meaning of section 71(a). Since section
71 (c), governing the deductibility of installments on a principal sum, also
refers to and depends upon the meaning of the same phrase in section
71 (a), it appears clear enough that installments on a principal sum desig-
nated for the wife and children, but not "fixing" the amount for the
children, would receive alimony treatment if otherwise qualifying under
either of the section 71(c) rules. If the wife dies before all payments are
made, then any amount payable to her estate in satisfaction of her marital
rights would presumably be deductible by the husband, and any amount
payable to the children would not receive alimony treatment. 5 While the
conclusions expressed seem sound, it is submitted that the matter should
be clarified by the Regulations.
II. TRANSFERS OF PROPERTY OTHER THAN CASH: RECOGNITION OF
GAIN OR Loss
A. Property other than Life Insurance
Gain or loss will ordinarily be recognized if a taxpayer discharges an
obligation by the delivery of property at a value other than his basis.57 On
the other hand, if a taxpayer delivers property to its owner, or partitions
property with his co-tenant, no transaction has been accomplished by
which gain or loss is recognized. 58
The application of the second of these principles to the husband-wife
situation is attended with difficulty because of the inexact nature of some
sThis observation cannot, unfortunately, be accurately made respecting other areas of
the income tax law. See Choka, The Sheer Hell of the Internal Revenue Code, 56 A.B.A.J.
762 (1970), a devastating but perfectly fair criticism of the manner in which many provisions
of the Code are drafted.
"See note 32 supra.
7See e.g., United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962); Rogers v. Commissioner, 103
F.2d 79 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 580 (1939).
5'See 370 U.S. at 67.
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marital property interests.59 Of course if the husband has registered in his
name stock or any other property belonging to the wife, no transaction
of gain or loss has been accomplished by the delivery of her property to
her. If, at the other extreme of this particular spectrum, the husband
makes one of his periodic payments to the wife for her support in appre-
ciated stock rather than in cash, he recognizes gain.
The problem of whether gain is realized when other rights of the wife
are satisfied is illustrated by two leading cases, United States v. Davis"0
and Collins v. Commissioner." In Davis, the husband and wife, both
Delaware residents, had entered into a property settlement agreement,
later approved by the divorce court, providing for periodic support pay-
ments for the wife and minor child; and also, as a "'division in settlement
of their property,' "612 the husband transferred to the wife certain shares
of stock which had appreciated in value. The division was accepted by the
wife in full satisfaction of her "claims and rights against the husband,"
including without limitation dower and inheritance. Under Delaware law,
the wife also had a right upon divorce to share in the husband's property
to an extent deemed reasonable by the court.13 The Court held that the
husband recognized gain upon the transfer of the stock, saying that the
wife's rights did not put her in the position of a co-owner of the husband's
property, but rather in the position of one whose rights had imposed a
personal liability upon him.
In Davis, the Court recognized that a different result would be reached
in community property states; but said that different results in-tax conse-
quences could be caused by local laws such as those applicable to marital
property in community property states and those applicable in common
law states.64 The Court summarily settled a problem that had given con-
cern to the lower courts, namely what value to assign to the transfer,65
holding that the market value on the date of transfer was determinative.
The scope of the Davis doctrine was tested in the Collins case, in which
the husband was held not to have recognized gain on the transfer to his
wife of stock in a closely held corporation. The wife had "brought into
the marriage" some $10,000; the corporation in which the husband was
a major stockholder had greatly prospered during the marriage; and as
part of the property settlement agreement, approved by the divorce
"See note 4 supra.
370 U.S. 65 (1962).
61412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
6370 U.S. at 66.
1Id. at 67, 70.
"Id. at 71.
65Compare Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1960) with Commis-
sioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2nd Cir. 1942) and Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.d 986
(3rd Cir. 1941).
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court," the husband had transferred to her a part of his stock which had
substantially appreciated. There was apparently no effort to follow the res
by showing that the wife's $10,000 had been invested in corporate stock
registered in the husband's name; and the court in its first opinion6 held
that the transfer was sufficiently similar to that in the Davis case for the
husband's gain to be recognized. While the case was on appeal to the
Supreme Court, the Oklahoma court decided that a State tax should not
be collected on the transfer of the stock to the wife, because the transfer
was a delivery to her of her interest in property jointly acquired during
the marriage.68 The case was consequently remanded 61 to the Court of
Appeals for reconsideration in the light of this Oklahoma decision. On
remand, the Court of Appeals held that it should "look to the law of the
State," and that under such law the present transfer more nearly resem-
bled a division of property between co-owners than it did a transfer in
satisfaction of a legal obligation, and consequently no gain was recog-
nized.
Although the Collins case has been termed an exception to the Davis
principle,7" it demonstrates that there may be an area where the wife is
not a co-owner by virtue of community property laws, but, because of a
combination of circumstances including the power of the court to make
an equitable allocation to her of property standing in the husband's name,
she is more like a co-owner than one who has the power to impose per-
sonal liability on the husband. It is highly doubtful that this area can be
clarified, in the absence of a change in the law, except by litigation.
The combination of the current practice of putting real and personal
property in the names of husband and wife with survivorship, the auto-
matic transformation of a tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy in com-
mon upon divorce, 71 and the strong presumption that payments by the
husband upon property taken in a co-tenancy with his wife constitute
gifts 72 may lead to fairly substantial divisions of property between hus-
band and wife without recognition of gain. Where, however, property is
so held and the husband decides to convey his one-half interest after
divorce to the wife, the Davis doctrine would apply, and the husband must
recognize any gain.
"6The divorce court in Oklahoma can allocate to the wife an equitable share of jointly
acquired property whether registered in the husband's name or not. The court takes into
consideration, among other factors, the wife's frugality and economy in the home. See
Collins v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 353, 354-58 (10th Cir. 1968). The court in discussing
the Oklahoma laws on this subject indicated that other states have similarly empowered their
courts.
"Collins v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968).
"Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968).
69Collins v. Commissioner, 393 U.S. 215 (1968).
7*Wallace v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 749, 759-62 (S.D. Iowa, 1970).
7 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
72See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 200 Va. 77, 104 S.E.2d 17 (1958).
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B. Transfer of Insurance
The Davis doctrine may be more of a tax trap where the parties are
not aware of it, or a deterrent where they are, in the event the parties
transfer or wish to transfer to the wife policies of insurance on the hus-
band's life. In addition to the recognition of gain,7 there may be ordinary
income tax consequences where interest has been accumulated with the
insurer. 74
Section 10 1 (a) of the Code provides the general rule that life insurance
proceeds are not taxable to the recipient. Where, however, the owner
trafficks in the policy, transferring it for value, there is excluded from
gross income of the transferee only his basis; and his basis would be what
he paid for the assignment plus premiums subsequently paid by him.75
Section 10 1 (a)(2)(B) exempts from the transfer for value rule a trans-
fer to the insured, to a partner of the insured, to a partnership in which
he is a partner, or to a corporation in which the insured was stockholder
or officer. Transfer for value to a wife or ex-wife is not included in the
exemption. The Davis rule consequently seems to apply; and presumably
an ex-wife to whom insurance has been transferred will report as income
the excess over the value of the policy at the time of transfer plus any
premiums subsequently paid by her.
76
It has been suggested that the wife who wants the additional security
of a policy of life insurance on her husband take out a new policy on his
life at the time of divorce, 77 and pay the premiums on it herself.7s The wife
being the owner of the policy, the Davis doctrine would not apply. Since,
however, the lack of money is endemic in divorce situations where two
households must be maintained in place of one, since the husband may
be uninsurable, and since the age of the husband may make the cost of a
new policy on his life beyond the parties' means, the suggested solution
may not be feasible. As a result, the parties may be practically compelled
"See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). See also Wenig, Use of Life Insurance
in Divorce and Separation Agreements, note 23 supra.
7 See Gallun v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1964). Making the wife irrevoca-
ble beneficiary of insurance on the husband's life does not trigger the Davis rule; and the
parties may be satisfied with such an arrangement instead of a transfer of ownership.
75
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a)(2).
7'INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101(e) assures that the wife will report for income tax
purposes amounts received from an insurance policy payable in installments, or from an
insurance trust. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.101-5 (1957).
7See note 21 supra. If'has also been suggested that in community property states life
inurance policies on the husband's life may be divided like other community property or a
single policy may be split.
7 1f the wife has all of the incidents of ownership, amounts furnished her by the husband
to pay the premiums on the policy will be subject to alimony treatment. Hyde v. Commis-
sioner, 301 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1962); Turpin v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Mo.
1965).
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to abandon any efforts to obtain the additional security which the hus-
band's life insurance might afford.
It is surprising, to say the least, that Congress regards the preservation
of a business for former partners or corporate associates as more impor-
tant than furnishing security for a family, even if an ex-wife is included.
C. The Inequities of the Davis Principle
As has been indicated, the law recognizes that a wife who has contrib-
uted to the establishment and maintenance of the marital home has quite
often made a contribution, direct or indirect, to the accumulation of
property during the marriage. 79 In community property states, this has
resulted in giving the wife a species of co-ownership. In some states, courts
are empowered to accord legal recognition to her contribution. In other
states, where the wife's rights are inchoate rights of dower and inheritance
only, the parties and their counsel may feel that a satisfactory arrange-
ment should include the transfer of some property in the husband's name
to the wife, including life insurance. While it is permissible for tax conse-
quences to be different because of differences in local law, it is certainly
desirable that there be uniformity in the various states;" it seems inequita-
ble for essentially the same transactions to cause recognition of gain in
some states and not in others.
It is submitted that the Davis doctrine should be reversed by statute,
and section 101 (a)(2)(B) should be amended to exempt from the transfer-
for-value-rule a transfer of life insurance for value to a wife or ex-wife as
a part of a property settlement agreement or decree of divorce or separa-
tion. Care should be taken in drafting such legislation to continue the
recognition of gain from transfers of appreciated property in satisfaction
of the husband's obligation to make periodic payments.
III. DISTRIBUTIONS TO THE WIFE FROM A TRUST
Two sections of the Code provide for taxability to the wife of distribu-
tions to her from trusts. Sections 71 (a)(l) and (2) Orovide for the inclusion
in the wife's income of periodic payments to her attributable to property
transferred in trust, made pursuant to a written separation agreement or
a decree of divorce or separate maintenance."' Section 682(a) provides for
"See Estate of Morrison T. O'Nan, 47 T.C. 648, 657 (1968).
"0Transfers in trust to the wife are taxable under the Davis doctrine. See Rev. Rul 59-
47, 1959-1 Cumi. BULL. 198; Rev. Rul. 57-507, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 511. Where, however,
the transfer is made as security for the husband's discharging a continuing obligation to
make periodic payments for support, the Davis doctrine does not apply. See Rev. Rul. 57-
506, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 65. It is therefore possible in some situations to avoid the applica-
tion of the Davis doctrine while at the same time recognizing the wife's contributions by
making a capital transfer for her benefit.
"The other subsections of § 71, including subsection (a)(3) dealing with decrees for
support, do not affect the present question.
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including in her gross income the amount of any income from a trust
which she is entitled to receive and which (except for section 682) would
be included in the husband's income. Subsection (b) of section 682 prov-
ides that the wife shall be considered, for purposes of computing the
taxable income of the trust and of the wife, as the beneficiary specified
"in this part.""2
The Commissioner has consistently taken the position that amounts
distributed from a trust to which section 71 is applicable are included in
the wife's gross income, irrespective of their nature.3 On the other hand,
the Commissioner has made it clear that distributions to the wife governed
by section 682 are taxable to her only pursuant to the rules applicable to
other trust beneficiaries." Thus capital distributions, if section 71 is appl-
icable, are includible in the wife's gross income, whereas they are not
includible if section 682 applies. It is consequently important to the wife
to determine which section of the Code governs, or, in the jargon of the
trade, whether there is involved a section 71 or a section 682 trust. No
answer is furnished by the past litigation, the legislative history, the lan-
guage of the Code sections, the Regulations, or the authorities.
The enactment of sections 71 and 215 was sparked by the decision of
Gould v. Gould.85 Two other Supreme Court decisions, Douglas v.
Wilcutts"6 and Helvering v. Fuller,u led to the enactment of section 682.
In Douglas, the Supreme Court applied in the divorce field the principle
that payments in discharge of one's obligations must be included in one's
income. The husband in the Douglas case contemplated a divorce," and
in an effort to avoid taxation upon the payments to his prospective ex-
wife, he created a trust and provided that certain amounts were to be paid
to the wife out of the trust income. Excess income was to be paid to the
husband; and on the wife's death the trust property was to revert to the
husband. All interests of the wife in the husband's property and earnings
were to be discharged by the agreement, which was approved by the
divorce court. Under applicable state law, however, the court was empow-
ered to revise its decree and the provisions for the wife. The Supreme
Court held that the trust income distributed to the wife was taxable to the
husband.
"rhe reference is to Part I, entitled "Estates, Trusts and Beneficiaries," of Subch. J
of the Code. See Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 894, 898 (6th Cir. 1969).
"Treas. Reg. §§ 1.71-1(c)(2)-(3), 1.682(a)-l(a)(2) (1957).
"Treas. Reg. §§ 1.682(a)-l(a)(2), 1.682(b)-l(a) (1957).
-245 U.S. 151 (1917).
-296 U.S. 1 (1935).
-310 U.S. 69 (1940). See also S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942); H.R.
REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46, 71 (1942); H.R. RaP. No. 2586, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 38 (1942).
"The divorce was obtained three days after the trust agreement was executed.
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In the Fuller case, decided five years later, it was held that the husband
was not taxable on trust income from an irrevocable trust, established
pursuant to an agreement in contemplation of a divorce, which was to
continue for 10 years during which all income was to be used for the
support of the wife or, if she died within the 10 years, of the children. At
the end of the 10 years, the trust property was to be delivered to the wife.
The divorce court (Nevada) had no power to change the decree approving
the property settlement agreement. The Supreme Court held that, since
under local law and the provisions of the trust the husband's obligations
were fully discharged by its establishment, the income from the trust was
not taxable as in discharge of his obligations, but was taxable to the wife
just as would be the income from any property belonging outright to her.
In order to abolish this distinction between payments to the wife from
a trust where the husband's obligations had ended and where they were
continuing,8" Congress enacted legislation, included as section 171 of the
1939 Code, which is now set out in substantially the same language in
section 682 of the Code.
Insofar as the husband is concerned, the relief given him from the
doctrines enunciated in Gould and Wilcutts is clear. He does not include
in his income distributions made to his wife from a trust, whether or not
the establishment of the trust completely discharges his obligations to the
wife, irrespective of his control over the trust, and irrespective of the
nature of the payment."0
Even though almost 30 years have elapsed since the enaction of sec-
tions 71, 215 and 682, taxability of trust distributions to the wife has not
been clarified. Of course, she would be taxed on the taxable income; but
the question remains as to whether her gross income includes distributions
of corpus or tax-free income. Many commentators have said that section
682 is applicable to this situation and that section 71 is not, if the trust
8"See Treas. Reg. § 1.682(a)-l(a)(3) (1957).
"0§ 71(d) expressly provides that the husband does not include in his income periodic
payments made to his wife from a trust. § 682(a) is to the same effect. This may limit the
husband's deductions for charitable contributions and increase his deductions for medical
expenses. See further, as to the taxability of the husband, Treas. Reg. § 1.682(a)-l(a)(3)
(1957), reading in part as follows:
(3) Section 682(a) is designed to produce uniformity as between cases in
which, without Section 682(a), the income of a so-called alimony trust
would be taxable to the husband because of his continuing obligation to
support his wife or former wife, and other cases in which the income of a
so-called alimony trust is taxable to the wife or former wife because of the
termination of the husband's obligation. Furthermore, Section 682(a)
taxes trust income to the wife in all cases in which the husband would
otherwise be taxed not only because of the discharge of his alimony obliga-
tion but also because of his retention of control over the trust income or
corpus. Section 682(a) applies whether the wife is the beneficiary under the
terms of the trust instrument or is an assignee of a beneficiary.
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was established prior to and not in contemplation of divorce or separa-
tion."1 This position seems unsound for three reasons: first, both the
Douglas and Fuller decisions, which led to the enactment of section 682,
concerned trusts which were created as a part of divorce settlements, not
trusts theretofore created; second, the Regulations, although ignoring the
factual situation in Douglas and Fuller, are opposed; 9 and third, the
distinction would depend upon happenstance alone.
9 3
It may next be suggested that the distributions are governed by section
682 if the establishment of the trust finally discharges the husband's
obligations arising out of the marriage, whereas section 71 applies if the
trust distributions are in discharge of any of the continuing obligations.94
This does not seem sound, however, since the very purpose of the enact-
ment of section 682 was to abolish the distinction made by the Douglas
and Fuller decisions.
There was little consideration of the question by the courts prior to
Ellis v. United States.9 In the Ellis case, the trust corpus consisted in part
of tax-free municipals; and the wife took the position that she could
exclude from her gross income9" the part of the distribution attributable
to interest on such securities. The court, rejecting the Commissioner's
argument that section 682(b) referred only to the accounting year, ap-
proached the problem as one of resolving conflicting policies expressed in
neighboring provisions of the Code. Since section 682(b) expressly prov-
ides that the wife should be considered as a beneficiary specified in Part
I of Subchapter J of the Code, the court held that the wife was, indeed,
"See note 23, supra; CLARK § 14.12; O'Byrne, Escape from Holy Deadlock, 45 TAXES
63, 75 (1967); Peschel, Income Taxation of Alimony Payments Attributable to Transferred
Property: Congressional Confusion, 44 TUL. L. REv. 223, 234 (1970); Note, Alimony Trust
Income: A Challenge to Taxability, 4 VALPARAISO U.L. REv. 181, 190 (1969); Note, Tax
Aspects ofAlimony Trusts, 66 YALE L.J. 881, 892 (1957).
12Treas. Reg. § 1.682(a)-l(a)(2) states in part as follows:
Section 682(a) does not apply in any case to which section 71 applies.
Although section 682(a) and section 71 seemingly cover some of the same
situations, there are important differences between them. Thus, section
682(a) applies, for example, to a trust created before the divorce or separa-
tion and not in contemplation of it, while section 71 applies only if the
creation of the trust or payments by a previously created trust are in
discharge of an obligation imposed upon or assumed by the husband (or
made specific) under the court order or decree divorcing or legally separat-
ing the husband and wife, or a written instrument incident to the divorce
status or legal separation status, or a written separation agreement. (em-
phasis added).
"While no one even slightly acquainted with internal revenue laws expects them to be
logical, all taxpayers assume that none of the provisions is based upon whim.
"See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.682(a)-1(a)(2) (1954), quoted note 92 supra.
2416 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1969).
"6See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 103(a)(1).
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despite section 71, taxable in the same manner as other trust beneficiaries;
thus, she was not required to include in her gross income the distribution
based upon the trust's receipt of tax-free interest.
The Ellis case raises an interesting speculation touched upon but not
discussed in depth by some of the commentators,97 the "creation of in-
come" in this field. Income is often "created" where it did not exist
before, as where a taxpayer discharges an obligation out of principal
rather than income. Except for capital gains realized, the payer-taxpayer
has no obligation to include in his gross income any capital so used; the
payee-taxpayer, however, even though he has received cdpital, must report
it as ordinary income.
Where husband and wife are married, they do not report any capital
received any more than they report tax-free income. When they are di-
vorced, the wife must report as income under section 71 periodic payments
made to her by the husband under that section, whether the source of the
payments is capital, tax-free income,9" or taxable income. Thus income is
"created" for tax purposes where none existed before. In deciding tax
consequences in the domestic relations field, Congress could have treated
the two taxpayers, after the divorce, in the same manner tax-wise as if they
were still married; and could have taxed the wife only upon payments
made to her by the husband out of his reportable income. Where no trust
is involved, Congress clearly did not choose to adopt this approach.
When, however, the question is of taxability because of distributions
from trusts, Congress has spoken in sections 641 to 668. The wife is
expressly given the benefit of these sections in section 682(b). With one
authority already resolving the question in favor of consistency in the
treatment of trust income, even though the beneficiary is a divorced wife,
it appears desirable that the provisions of section 71(a)(1) and (2) should
be similarly brought into line. The effect will not be to diminish taxable
income; it will only be that taxable income is no more "created" where
the trust benefits a divorced wife than where the beneficiary is not so
related to the settlor or assignor.
IV. GIFT AND ESTATE TAXES
Since property settlement agreements and divorce decrees generally
provide for transfers to the wife and the children, some of which may
commence upon or continue after the husband's death, questions arise
concerning the imposition of gift or estate taxes.
These questions are answered against the background of sporadic ef-
7See, e.g., Peschel, supra note 91, at 227.
"8See Neeman v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 864 (1956). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.71-
1(c)(2) (1957).
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forts by husbands, where no marital discord exists or is in prospect, to
avoid or minimize such taxes by making conveyances purporting to be in
discharge of obligations arising out of the marital relation.9" The gift'00
and estate tax statutes'0 1 both exempt transfers made "for adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth . . ."; and arguments have
been made that transfers by husbands to the wife or children during or in
contemplation of marriage fulfilled the statutory requirements."'
These efforts led to the enactment of section 2043(b) which provides
that the relinquishment of dower or curtesy (or a statutory estate in lieu
thereof) or "of other marital rights . . ." did not constitute statutory
consderation insofar as the estate tax was concerned, and the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that, estate and gift taxes being in pari materia and the
respective statutes using the same phrase to define consideration, the prov-
isions of section 2043(b) would be effective in the gift tax field as well. 0 3
Also in the background is recognition of the fact that, where the
marriage has ended, transfers provided by agreements or decrees are not
made in the same voluntary way as inter vivos or testamentary gifts are.0 4
The Courts and the Commissioner have followed what appear to be some-
what oblique methods to carve out two limitations upon gift and estate
taxes in this field.
A. The "Decree" Way of A voiding Gift and Estate Taxes
The first is the so-called "decree" limitation. If the transfer is ordered
by a decree, even though based upon an agreement and even though the
agreement and decree both provide that the provisions of the agreement
shall survive the decree, there is no gift or estate tax."5 The principle was
"Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945); Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945);
Dwight W. Ellis, Jr., 51 T.C. 182 (1968). The above cases all involved property settlements.
The question may also arise in connection with routine transfers. If the husband makes
excessive transfers to his wife and children to reduce his estate, beyond what is necessary to
"keep up with the Joneses," he may have made a series of gifts. See the discussion in
Commissioner v. Rosenthal, note 2 supra.
..INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2512(b). See also § 2516.
'. NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2035-38.
1°2See cases cited in note 99, supra; H. Rep. No. 1337, S. Rep. No. 2543, 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (1954).
'See Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950); Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324
U.S. 303 (1945); Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945).
10 'See discussion in Robert Rodger Glen, 45 T.C. 323, and the cases cited, including
Commissioner v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). The requirement that the transferor have a
donative intent for the gift tax to apply was repudiated in Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324
U.S. 303, 306; see Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106, 113 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
"'Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950); Morrison T. O'Nan, 47 T.C. 648
(1968); Rev. Rul. 68-379, 1968-2 Cum. Bull. 414. There is authority that the transfer has to
be made after the decree, Commissioner v. Barnard's Estate, 176 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1949);
but in the O'Nan case, the transfer was held not subject to the estate tax although made
before the decree, where the court was considered to have power to order reconveyance.
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established in Harris v. Commissioner,' but again the holding was based
upon a provision of the estate tax law'07 limiting deductions of claims
against the estate, when founded on a promise or agreement, to the extent
that they were for the statutory consideration. The dissenting opinion did
not complain of this legalistic sleight of hand, and remarked that the gift
tax should not apply to transfers "in obedience to law . . .,;" but stated
that the transfer in question was really made pursuant to the agreement
and not to the decree, since both provided that the agreement should
survive the decree.
The power of the divorce court to decree the transfers involved in the
Harris case was not questioned. The authorities developing the law fur-
ther ' have made it clear that the court entering the decree must have the
power to do so independently of the property settlement agreement; and
so, while the court may adopt the agreement, it also has the power to reject
or incorporate its provisions only in part in the decree.
The position has consequently been taken"' that since the divorce
courts generally lack the power to order the support of adult children,
transfers made pursuant to a decree providing for their support are not
shielded from the gift or estate taxes. This seems to be improper in two
situations, first, where the child is so handicapped as to remain the respon-
sibility of the parents;'" and second, where the decree provides, in accord-
ance with a growing tendency, for the child's higher education."'
A strict interpretation of the decree limitation might also result in an
inappropriate failure to enforce it in some of the states which lack power
to order transfers of property except for periodic alimony." 3 The discus-
sion in Morrison T. O'Nan"4 points out that a practice by Courts of
approving property settlement agreements is not an indication that the
1-340 U.S. 106 (1950).
NIT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 812(b). The same provisions are substantially contained
in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(e).
'lSFrankfurter, J., 340 U.S. at 115.
"'See Morrison T. O'Nan, 47 T.C. 648 (1967); Hartshorne v. Commissioner, 402 F.2d
592 (2d Cir. 1968) (estate tax).
"'See Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1953); Hartshorne v. Commis-
sioner, 402 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1968); Rev. Rul. 68-379, note 109 supra. The same policy is
reflected in INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2516, discussed note 123 and accompanying text
infra.
'Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614,44 S.E.2d 31 (1947); Annot., I A.L.R. 2d 910 (1948).
"MCalogeras v. Calogeras, 100 Ohio 2d 441, 163 N.E.2d 713 (1959); see Annot., 56
A.L.R. 2d 1207 (1957).
"3See CLARK § 14.8.
"'In the O'Nan case the court stated:
...it is obvious as a practical matter that divorce courts are not
going to freely and wantonly change or vary settlement agreements reached
by the parties just to prove their undoubted authority ....
47 T.C. at 660.
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Courts are not adjudicating the propriety of the provisions. Since under
Kentucky law the divorce court has the authority to order property trans-
fers at least to some extent, this discussion may not be helpful to an
avoidance of the taxes in jurisdictions where the Courts lack power to
order any capital transfers, at least unless the principle is established that
a court's power to order the enforcement of provisions in a decree entered
by consent makes the transfers provided for judicially sanctioned. Until
this principle is so established-and if it is, the law respecting transfers
of property to adult children ordered by a consent decree would also be
logically repudiated--counsel would be well advised to depend upon the
limitation next following, or upon the statutory avoidance of gift tax."'
B. The Support Way of A voiding Gift and Estate Taxes
The second limitation is that transfers are free from gift and estate
taxes to the extent that they are made in satisfaction of the husband's
obligation to support his wife and children."' As pointed out above," 7
section 2043(b) provides that transfers for the relinquishment of dower or
equivalent statutory rights or "of other marital rights . . ." do not satisfy
the statutory requiremnts for consideration in this situation. It would
certainly have been thought, a priori, that marital rights would include
the right to support."8 However, the Commissioner, and subsequently the
Courts,"' have repudiated this assumption. Yet it seems obvious that the
assumption is sound; no husband is either practically or legally making a
gift either during or after the marriage to the extent that he supports his
dependents, and no danger of evasion of transfer or succession taxes is
reasonably to be anticipated by his satisfaction of this obligation.
Complications may arise when there are taken into consideration in
valuing the support rights the life expectancies of all concerned and the
prospect of the wife's remarriage, which generally terminates her right to
support. Fortunately for the instruction of the bar, an agreement involving
many such factors was entered into between Donald M. Nelson and his
115The power of the court to refuse a property settlement agreement when it is initially
offered is to be distinguished from the inability of the court to change such an agreement
once it is admitted to record without objection. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN., § 20-109 and
Dienhart v. Dienhart, 210 Va. 101, 168 S.E.2d 279 (1969). If a court is by statute precluded
from amending a property settlement agreement which has been judicially accepted, then
gift and estate taxes would not be avoided by a subsequent decree which the court has no
power to enter.
"'E.T. 19, 1946-2 Cum . BULL. 166, superseded by Rev. Rul. 68-379; Commissioner v.
Nelson, 396 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1968). Again the authorities mean minor children.
"rext accompanying note 103 supra.
"'Periodic payments for support satisfy the requirements of §§ 71 (a)(1) and (2) provid-
ing for obligations arising out of the marital relation.
"'Note 116 supra.
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wife, and the opinions in the Tax Court and the 2d Circuit provide valua-
ble guidance. 120
The two limitations (the "decree" limitation and the "support" limi-
tation) on gift and estate taxes do not exhaust the possibilities. The recent
case of Robert Rodger Glen'2 1 demonstrates that where a transfer is made
in consideration of the wife's relinquishment of vested property rights
created in her as a result of the marriage, the statutory requirement of full
and adequate consideration is fulfilled. The principle would, of course,
apply either in states where the wife obtained a vested interest in commun-
ity property, or vested interests pursuant to laws such as were involved in
the Collins'2 case.
C. The Statutory Way of A voiding the Gift Tax
According to section 2516,"2 the gift tax is not applicable to transfers
made pursuant to a written property settlement agreement to the extent
that the transfers are made to the wife in settlement of her marital or
property rights, or are made to provide an allowance for the support of
issue of marriage during minority. The section only applies where the
divorce occurs within two years of the approval of the agreement and it
applies irrespective of the approval of the agreement by the divorce decree.
It should be noted that, again, transfers for the support of dependent adult
children are still subject to the tax. Congressional action would be re-
quired to include in the statutory exemption transfers for the support of
handicapped children or for the higher education of children over 2 1.
The statutory method should make it possible to assure the avoidance
of gift taxes in most states, even though the written agreement is required.
Situations in which a no-fault divorce is granted on the ground of the two-
year separation'2 4 would well accommodate the statutory method. Some
maneuvering might be required, under laws such as that recently enacted
in New York'2 enabling the husband to obtain a divorce after he has
12047 T.C. 279; 396 F.2d 519. In Hartshorne v. Commissioner, 402 F.2d 592 (2d Cir.
1968), there was a promise to create a trust by will for the wife for life and then for the
children. There is a discussion in the footnotes of the case from which it may be inferred
that the court thought it arguable that the valuation of the property transferred and the
valuation of the wife's support rights should be made as of the husband's death and not as
of the time of transfer. The Commissioner took but later relinquished this position in the
Nelson case, note 116 supra. Both valuations should be made as of the time of transfer.
Otherwise, the Service would largely have its cake and eat it too; since inflation and the
diminishing value of the wife's support rights as she got older would both work in its favor.
12'Robert Rodger Glen, 45 T.C. 323 (1966).
12 Note 46 supra. This case involved a situation where the wife had substantially contrib-
uted to the accumulation of property during marriage.
'2Act of Aug. 16, 1954, c. 736, 68A Stat. 409.
'7See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN., § 20-91(9) (Supp. 1971); CLARK § 12.6.
120See Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 256 N.E.2d 513, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1970).
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fulfilled for two years the requirements of a separation agreement. Per-
haps amendment of the agreement within the two-year period would be
sufficient.
V. ATTORNEYS' FEES
One might think that lawyers, upon ascending the bench as judges,
would remain sympathetic toward the deduction of legal fees and
costs-perhaps because of a lingering fellow-feeling for their former
clients if not for their former associates. The contrary has proven to be
true. The courts have inclined in the other direction, and, at times, as-
cended to metaphysical realms in requiring capitalization of legal expen-
ses rather than allowing them as ordinary deductions.2 6
Amendments of the Internal Revenue Code were intended to counter
this tendency in two areas: expenses for the management, conservation,
maintenance of property held for the production of income; and expenses
for tax services.127 The first of these amendments has been only partly
successful in the separation and divorce field.
In two companion cases, l2 the United States Supreme Court substan-
tially made section 212(2) inapplicable to the legal expenses of the hus-
band in protecting his income-producing property against the demands of
his wife. Although a considerable portion of these expenses was clearly
attributable to efforts to procure the reduction of these demands, the
Court refused to allow the claimed deduction, and the husband was rele-
gated in one case to the course, unsatisfactory both from the point of view
of tax minimization and of sensible accounting principles, of obtaining the
approval of the lower court for a capitalization of the expenses.
129
The wife meets less resistance to the allowance of her legal expenses,
since her attorney is working with almost irrefutable obviousness towards
securing income or income producing property for her.30 Both spouses
have little difficulty, of course, in obtaining a deduction of expenses for
tax advice, since section 212(3) expressly requires such allowance.
It is believed that two methods may be used to facilitate the allowance
of legal expenses under section 212(2) as ordinary deductions. First, bills
should be rendered for expenses related to the production of income for
the wife or the conservation of income-producing property for the hus-
band; and these bills should be rendered in advance of or prior to the
completion of actual divorce litigation. Separate bills should then be ren-
12$See4 R.I.A., TAX COORDINATOR L-1905 (1967).
'"INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 212(2), (3).
resUnited States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963); United States v. Patrick, 372 U.S. 53
(1963).
'Gilmore v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
M4 R.I.A., TAX COORDINATOR L-1921 (1972); Treas. Reg. § 1.262-I (1958).
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dered for the divorce or separation proceeding. Second, the husband's
contribution toward the wife's legal expenses, which is not deductible as
such,13 1 may be reduced to a monetary amount and the first installments
to the wife increased so as to include these expenses in the periodic pay-
ments to her. The Commissioner may assail this as an effort to do indi-
rectly what cannot be accomplished directly; but since the soundness of
the Patrick and Gilmore cases -is questionable, the taxpayer may prevail.
CONCLUSION
The overall efficiency and honesty with which the United States in-
come, gift, and estate tax laws have been administered, with the collection
from millions of taxpayers of billions of dollars over a period of many
years, irrespective of changes of administration, are certainly one of the
current financial wonders of this century. To a greater extent than in other
fields of the law,3 2 progress has been made toward the end that the provi-
sions particularly applicable to taxes upon divorce and separation are
clearly drafted, express a sensible policy, are properly coordinated with
related provisions, and are properly administered.
It seems especially important that taxation in this particular field,
unfortunately involving so many families at a time of stress and strain and
'See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
'1Note 55 supra. Examples of baffling draftsmanship recur in the Code; a recent one,
hardly more noteworthy than others, is § 4947(a)(2) of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which
reads as follows:
(2) Split-Interest Trusts. In the case of a trust which is not exempt from
tax under section 501(a) not all of the unexpired interests in which are
devoted to one or more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B)
and which has amounts in trust for which a deduction was allowed under
section 170, 545(b)(2), 556(b)(2), 642(c), 2055, 2106(a)(2), or 2522, section
507 (relating to termination of private foundation status), section 508(e)
(relating to governing instruments) to the extent applicable to a trust de-
scribed in this paragraph, section 4941 (relating to taxes on self-dealing),
section 4943 (relating to taxes on excess business holdings) except as prov-
ided in sub-section (b)(3), section 4944 (relating to investments which jeop-
ardize charitable purpose) except as provided in subsection (b)(3), and
section 4945 (relating to taxes on taxable expenditures) shall apply as if
such trust were a private foundation. This paragraph shall not apply with
respect to-
(A) any amount payable under the terms of such trust to income
beneficiaries, unless a deduction was allowed under section 170(f)(2)(B),
2055(e)(2)(B), or 2522(c)(2)(B),
(B) any amounts in trust other than amounts for which a deduction
was allowed under section 170, 545(b)(2), 556(b)(2), 642(c), 2055,
2106(a)(2), or 2522, if such other amounts are segregated from amounts
for which no deduction was allowable, or
(C) any amounts transferred in trust before May 27, 1969.
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when financial problems are accentuated, should be simple and clear, so
that tax minimization may not only be achieved, but achieved with assur-
ance and without the need for the added expense and harassment of litiga-
tion. It is hoped that the suggestions made in this article may be of some
service in achieving greater clarification and more equitable application
of the federal income tax laws.
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